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The focus of this brief will be on Sunni Islamism in 
general, and will include observations that apply to 
both its peaceful and violent strands.
Islam is a complex corpus of belief and practice 
open to multiple interpretations, from which dif-
ferent kinds of political attitudes can be legiti-
mized, depending on which part of the corpus one 
decides to stress. Islamist ideology is one possible 
reading of this corpus. How, then, does Islam mat-
ter for Islamism?
One way of making sense of this is through Social 
Movement Theory (SMT). The advantage of an 
SMT approach is that it deculturalizes Islamism 
and views it as a social movement like any other. 
In SMT terms, religion then becomes a symbolic 
resource which Islamists use, in selective ways, to: 
define and reinforce an identity, frame their mes-
sage and provide legitimacy to their actions. At a 
more practical level, Islam also provides specific 
mobilizing structures that can be used for gather-
ing or recruitment, (such as the mosques).
A problem with the SMT approach is that reli-
gion is treated as a discursive resource available 
to anyone, regardless of the position from which 
that person is speaking. In other words, there is 
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a general sentiment that the traditional produc-
ers and guardians of religious discourse, the ulama 
(the Islamic scholars), are irrelevant (or have been 
made irrelevant by the Islamists). It can be argued 
that this is the result of a western modernist bias, 
which makes researchers look at the ulama as a 
mere survival from the past with no real influence. 
In this paper it is argued that the ulama do matter 
significantly and that their lack of support for the 
Islamists has represented a major challenge to the 
Islamist movement.
The ulama’s lack of support for Islamists has been 
mentioned in some academic works, and it has 
generally been explained by the dominance among 
ulama of a strong tradition of quietism, which goes 
back to the early centuries of Islam. If it is true that 
most ulama have indeed been quietists, there exist 
a number of counter-examples in Islamic history, 
starting with Ahmad Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya 
(1263-1328), who did not hesitate to proclaim ji-
had against the Mongols, despite the fact that the 
latter had in appearance converted to Islam. This 
shows that the ulama’s lack of support for Islamists 
does not only stem from their supposed quietism. 
My contention here is that there exists a structural 
explanation. The idea that there is no clergy in Is-
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lam has obscured the fact that, throughout history, 
a certain division of labor has  developed in Mus-
lim societies, as a result of which the ulama have 
come to constitute a distinct and separate social 
group. In the terminology of the French sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu, they have constituted a ‘field’: the 
religious field. This is more easily acknowledged in 
Shiism because the ‘religious field’ there has been 
institutionalized, and what resembles a religious 
caste, with distinctive clerical features, has taken 
shape since the period of the Safavid dynasty. In 
Sunnism similar dynamics are present, though 
they are not as visible.
The Saudi example
In this context, the case of Saudi Arabia is in-
teresting. In Saudi Arabia, there are very clear 
boundaries between who is an alim (the singular 
of ulama) and who is not. There are certain places 
of learning and certain networks of transmission 
that produce the ulama. Those who do not belong 
to these networks may well call themselves ulama, 
but people will never take them seriously and may 
even make fun of them. To mark their status, the 
Saudi ulama have historically developed a specific 
dress code: they shorten their thobes (traditional 
men’s dress) and remove the iqal, the circle that 
holds the shmagh (the piece of cloth that Saudis 
wear on their heads). Interestingly, this is not an 
application of any religious principle but is pure 
’distinction’, as Bourdieu would call it. In many 
ways, the azhari dress in Egypt plays a similar 
role. 
In the last few years, there has been a growing body 
of literature on how globalization and the rise of 
a new ‘Muslim public sphere’ have fragmented 
the religious sphere, implicitly resulting in the in-
fluence of the ulama being weakened. This brief 
states, however, that on the ground this is not so, 
and that the opposite may even be the case: in 
some respects, globalization actually made the ula-
ma stronger by providing them with new vehicles 
to channel their influence. Through the new me-
dia, the Egyptian sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who 
is based in Qatar and has a weekly very popular 
religious talk-show on al-Jazeera, has, from being a 
‘local mufti’, become a ‘global mufti’.  
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Historically, Islamism emerged as a movement of 
religious laymen, and still today it consists prima-
rily of teachers, engineers, doctors etc. It emerged 
partly in reaction to what these religious laymen 
considered the ulama’s failure to defend Islam 
against Western influence and corrupt regimes. 
Islamism is thus as much a rebellion against estab-
lished political authorities as it is a rebellion against 
the religious authorities. 
These religious laymen’s attempts to sideline the 
ulama was made legitimate by the Salafi intellec-
tual posture that many of them advocated: if what 
was needed was a return to the fundamentals of 
Islam, resulting in sidelining centuries of Islamic 
tradition, the upholders of this tradition were not 
as central anymore. This hostility to the ulama was 
not always as explicit as in the words of Sayyid 
Qutb and a few others who were particularly harsh 
with established religious authorities, but it was 
generally present. 
The ulama were distressed by the rise of this new 
Islamist movement. It had emerged outside their 
control and was independent of them, yet it 
claimed to be acting in the name of Islam, a re-
source they had always considered their monopoly. 
In the Saudi case, it could even be argued that the 
rise of Islamism from the 1960s onwards prompt-
ed the development of a new genre of literature, 
in which the ulama reaffirmed their leading role 
in society as ’heirs of the prophets’ (warathat al- 
anbiya). This can be seen as a clear sign that they 
felt their position was called into question. This 
point is confirmed by numerous interviews con-
ducted by the author in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, 
in which ulama express their disgust with doctors 
or engineers who claim the right to talk with au-
thority in the name of Islam. 
An important point is that the ulama and Islamists 
belong to two distinct social fields, which are fun-
damentally in competition. The struggle between 
them is not necessarily one of diverging interpreta-
tions of Islam. On the contrary, one will find as 
much writing about sharia and the necessity of an 
Islamic state in the ulama’s literature as in Islam-
ist writings. The dividing line is a structural – one 




The Islamists have quickly come to understand that 
they could not succeed without minimal support 
from the ulama. Bringing the two groups together 
has not been easy. The following quote from a lead-
ing Saudi Islamist opposition figure (and a surgeon 
by training) illustrates the tension between these 
two groups and the difficulties in them working to-
gether. When asked about his views on the ulama, 
he responded: ‘The ulama? They are a necessary 
evil. As an Islamist movement, one can do nothing 
without their support. But they are conservative! 
And so out of this world! And they always believe 
they should take the lead, even when they have no 
idea of what’s going on’. 
The Islamists’ inability to obtain ulama support 
explains, in many ways, the failure of the joint Is-
lamic Gihad-al-Gama’a Islamiyya attempt to over-
throw the Egyptian regime in 1981. The revolu-
tionary Islamists could only enlist the support of 
one relatively minor sheikh, namely Sheikh Omar 
Abd al-Rahman (who was to become known as the 
blind sheikh, imprisoned in the US since 1993). 
The rest of the religious establishment, with al-
Azhar at the forefront, vehemently opposed them. 
Though they had relatively good operational ca-
pacities and managed to kill Sadat, the popular up-
rising which followed failed miserably. The reason 
is that it is unlikely that a movement opposed by 
virtually all religious authorities would enjoy gen-
eral widespread popular support.
In the few cases in which a significant part of the 
ulama establishment supported an Islamist mobi-
lization, it was essentially for the ‘wrong’ reasons. 
An interesting case is Saudi Arabia in the wake of 
the 1990 Gulf War, where a mobilization spear-
headed by Islamist intellectuals acting with dissi-
dent ulama took place. Yet, the study of the origins 
of this movement shows that a struggle had been 
going on for about a decade within the religious 
field between the established ulama and a new gen-
eration of peripheral ulama. In order to prevail in 
this conflict, the peripheral ulama chose to support 
the Islamists. This was a strategic decision, and it 
did not last long. By 1992-1993, dissident ulama 
and Islamist intellectuals were beginning to quarrel 
over fundamentally different objectives and world 
views. The Islamists criticized the dissident ulama 
for their ‘corporatism’ and for only being willing 
to defend and expand the privileges of their own 
‘caste’, with no real interest in a broader reform 
project. After the collapse of the movement in the 
mid-1990s, the dissident ulama dissociated them-
selves completely from the Islamist opposition and 
returned to the religious field, a position they have 
maintained until this day.
The failure of this first major Islamist mobilization 
in Saudi Arabia provided the context in which al-
Qaeda started to grow as a visible entity. Like other 
Islamist movements, al-Qaeda was founded by lay-
men, including Osama bin Laden, a graduate in 
economics, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, a surgeon. 
They soon encountered the familiar problem: very 
few ulama were ready to support them. This situa-
tion has remained until this day.
This lack of religious support has been a key handi-
cap for ‘jihadists’ because, since the cost of their 
actions is higher, they tend to need more thorough 
justification. To escape this predicament, jihadis 
have used different strategies, arguably with lim-
ited success:
1. They have tended to rely on medieval ulama 
rather than contemporary ones. Ibn Taymiyya 
is widely quoted and seen as the ideal figure of 
an alim-mujahid. 
2. In many cases, the Islamists pretended to have 
support that in fact they did not have. For in-
stance, in the mid-1990s, bin Laden claimed 
the support of the two Saudi dissident ulama 
Salman al-‘Awda and Sarfar al-Hawli, who were 
then in jail. The two were quick to dissociate 
themselves from al-Qaeda when they were re-
leased in 1999. Another interesting example is 
how Abdallah Azzam seems to have thought he 
needed to claim the support of religious heavy-
weights for the conclusions in his 1984 book 
The Defence of Muslim Territories is the First In-
dividual Duty. In the introduction to his book, 
he thus claimed to have received support from 
Saudi Arabia’s two most prominent religious 
authorities, Sheikhs Ibn Baz and Ibn Uthay-
min, something which never happened.
3. Al-Qaeda groups also started to bestow the 
names sheikh and mufti upon anyone with even 
the smallest measure of religious capital, in 
some cases drop-outs from religious universi-
ties. This was, for example, what al-Qaeda in 
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the Arabian Peninsula did rather pathetically 
after 2004 in the case of Abd al-Majid al-Mu-
nay and Sultan al-Utaybi. 
4. In parallel with these  attempts to claim the 
support of ulama, al-Qaeda’s Saudi militants 
began striving to redefine their raison d’être and 
the purpose of their actions. In their writings, 
jihad became a crystalline principle whose 
implications, notably the obligation for eve-
ryone to engage in armed combat against the 
infidels, were presented as being so clear that 
no interpretations were needed. According to 
their rhetoric, any exegesis seemed dangerous 
because it risked sullying the purity of jihad 
by introducing elements of political pragma-
tism. As a result, involvement of the ulama 
was unnecessary and could even turn out to 
be harmful. Jihad was thus presented as a ho-
listic category which encompassed and went 
beyond ‘ilm (religious science). According to 
the Saudi jihadi web-ideologue Luwis ‘Atiyyat 
Allah: ‘True religion consists (of conducting 
jihad,) not religious repeating text like parrots 
or transmitting them like donkeys … That is 
why the best evidence of tawhid is the gift of 
one’s soul to God on the fields of jihad or in 
the struggle against the tyrant.’
5. The same tendency to make ‘ilm derive from 
jihad – not the contrary – is illustrated by the 
fact that the leaders of jihadi movements in-
creasingly call themselves sheikhs, even when 
they do not possess any religious qualifica-
tions. For instance, the leaders of al-Qaeda are 
referred to as ‘Sheikh Usama bin Laden’ and 
‘Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri’. To justify this, 
some may play on the ambiguity of the term 
sheikh because it can also serve as a simple 
mark of respect, although it generally has clear 
religious undertones. 
concluSion
Despite their claim to speak and act in the name of 
religion, the paradox of Islamists is that they have 
constantly encountered great problems in win-
ning the support of the ulama, which has limited 
their ability to mobilize. This is even more the case 
for violent Islamist movements, because the cost 
of mobilization is higher for them and so it needs 
more thorough justification. What this article ar-
gues is that the predicament is a structural, not 
a contextual one, which therefore remains a key 
problem for Islamist movements. 
The popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt may seem a counter-example, but this is 
actually not the case. Indeed, the Brotherhood 
counts very few ulama within its ranks (only one 
religious scholar sits in the Guidance Bureau, Abd 
al-Rahman al-Barr), and interviews conducted 
with Egyptian ulama suggest that a lot of ulama 
are weary of the Brotherhood. Sheikh Youssef al-
Qaradawi represents an important exception, but 
the extent of his influence is due to the magic of 
the new media, which is able to make one man as 
influential as a thousand. 
The popularity of the Brotherhood thus largely 
results from two other factors: political circum-
stances (the fact that they were the only credible 
opposition for decades) and their social work. The 
religious discourse (on which they do not have a 
monopoly, as everyone uses religious discourse in 
Egypt anyway) does not seem to be the reason for 
their popularity. This slightly counter-intuitive 
fact should lead us to reconsider the relationship 
between Islamism as a vehicle for social mobiliza-
tion and the influence of authoritative religious 
discourse.
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